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She gave a short summary of different jobs she had throughout her career that got her to where she is today, and also answered lots of questions from chapter members.
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Chapter Events. These uncertainties include a risk that depositors will want their money back sooner than expected. Reserves are the most reliable and safest source of liquidity because they are immediately available for payments and do not have a changing market value.
Nevertheless, before the crisis, banks typically tried to minimize reserve balances because reserves earned zero interest, whereas other highly liquid assets, such as Treasury bills, earned a sizable positive yield.
Given this high opportunity cost, demand for reserves was relatively close to reserve balance requirements prior to the crisis.
Today, reserves are less expensive to hold than they were before the crisis because the Federal Reserve now pays IOER, which is the principal tool used to control short-term interest rates.
In particular, there are new factors driving reserve demand, and that demand is, and will likely continue to be, much higher than it was before the crisis.
To start, the crisis appropriately changed attitudes toward risk and increased focus on managing liquidity risk.
The subsequent creation of a liquidity regulatory framework for larger banks reinforced the benefits of holding unencumbered liquid assets for both domestic and foreign banks.
While these liquidity regulations do not themselves impose any specific requirements to hold central bank reserves, many banks now use internal models that also estimate the very short-term liquidity they need to hold in order to be prepared for a stress scenario.
The bank may therefore decide to hold a portion of its liquidity buffer as reserves on an ongoing basis as a precautionary measure.
Through our outreach to banks, we also hear that some are more reluctant to borrow from the Federal Reserve than they were prior to the financial crisis.
For some banks, this reluctance increases the precautionary demand for reserves to meet large intraday payment obligations and manage unexpected volatility in deposits.
To get a more systematic reading of the factors driving reserve demand as well as the size of this demand, the Federal Reserve conducted a Senior Financial Officer Survey SFOS in September and again this February.
The survey results revealed that a number of important sources of reserve demand are present. As shown in Figure 4 , which presents September survey responses, the majority of both domestic and foreign banks cited internal liquidity stress tests and meeting intraday payment flows as important or very important drivers of reserve demand.
In addition, meeting potential deposit outflows specifically was important or very important for almost three quarters of domestic banks, compared to around a third of foreign banks.
The diversity of drivers also highlights how demand for reserves could change if banks move from one strategy to another or refine an existing one over time.
The surveys asked each bank to report the level of reserves it would hold at the prevailing constellation of rates before taking active steps to maintain or increase its reserve balances.
Figure 5 shows total LCLoRs for foreign respondents and domestic respondents, and the extrapolated demand for the rest of the banking system.
As you can see, each group has considerable demand for reserves, although this demand is still well below current reserve levels and far below the peak reserve levels reached in To connect this back to the stylized framework, in a world with perfect information and no financial market frictions, an estimate of aggregate reserve demand derived from summing and scaling the reported demand of individual institutions might correspond to a level just to the right of the steeper portion of the demand curve.
However, there are reasons why the amount of reserves a central bank needs to supply to remain in a floor system could deviate from such an estimate.
First, an estimate of demand for reserves is simply an estimate; the true amount could be higher or lower.
This scenario could occur if there are financial market frictions to redistributing reserves that result in some banks persistently holding a surplus of reserves above their LCLoR.
For example, banks now suggest that they face higher balance sheet costs to lend in federal funds, making it possible that this market would not be as efficient at redistributing reserves late in the day as it was prior to the crisis.
In practice, assessing the lowest level of reserves necessary to remain on the flat, or flatter, part of the demand curve will entail not only periodically conducting the SFOS in collaboration with the Board of Governors, but also broader monitoring and analytical efforts in order to continuously inform our assessment of the demand for reserves and reserve conditions.
Transacted rates in the federal funds market are relatively stable, and the vast majority of trades are within the target range.
Additional monitoring of bank microdata also suggests that reserves are well supplied. Since mid-March, overnight repo rates have generally traded above federal funds rates, providing an attractive investment opportunity for the Federal Home Loan Banks FHLBs that invest a portion of their liquidity portfolios in both markets.
As the dominant lenders in the federal funds market, FHLBs may have been able to negotiate higher overnight lending rates with banks that regularly use federal funds to fund non-reserve assets or meet payments, and on occasion with banks that borrow to improve their Liquidity Coverage Ratios LCR by borrowing from government sponsored enterprises.
In line with a slightly higher EFFR, the overall share of above-IOER borrowing in markets underlying the overnight bank funding rate has been growing somewhat, as shown in Figure 6 , although a large majority of activity is still transacted within a couple of basis points of IOER.
As long as these rates remain relatively stable and at modest spreads above IOER, we don't see this as indicating that reserves are not well supplied.
Indeed, an examination of daily reserve levels of individual banks shows that currently most banks remain well above their reported LCLoRs, suggesting that reserves remain ample.
In fact, some banks with surplus reserves have been redistributing these reserves by shifting the composition of their HQLA high quality liquid assets by lending in repo markets when rates are attractive, suggesting secured markets are providing a means to redistribute reserves.
If competition for reserves were to increase, we might expect to see a more meaningful day-to-day relationship between changes in the level of reserves and overnight rates.
There continues to be no discernable relationship. Our assessment of reserve demand is likely to change over time as we continue learning, and could move higher or lower based on new information from analysis of data, surveys, and outreach.
I will now look ahead and turn to how the Desk could supply reserves through open market operations to maintain an ample-reserves regime.
As the level of reserves declines, the Desk will monitor medium-term forecasts of reserves and other indicators of reserve conditions.
At some point, the FOMC will decide that the system has reached a level of reserves consistent with efficient and effective implementation.
Once this determination has been made by the FOMC, the Desk will need to conduct outright purchases of Treasury securities to supply reserves in order to offset the general decline in reserves from trend growth in non-reserve liabilities and ensure that reserves remain ample.
However, the size of these purchases will likely be larger in nominal terms because the growth of non-reserve liabilities is larger.
These purchases could also be structured in size and timing to supply a sufficient amount of reserves so that normal variability in non-reserve liabilities would not require predictable repo market operations to offset the corresponding reserve level changes.
A buffer of reserves executed through Treasury purchases would diminish the need for the Desk to conduct frequent, sizable repo operations, which might be difficult to implement given reduced elasticity of primary dealer balance sheets for tri-party repo in the post-crisis era.
Let me make the discussion of the buffer more concrete by focusing on the TGA. Treasury which, similar to a checking account, allows Treasury to deposit or withdraw cash every day.
Figure 8 shows a scatterplot of weekly changes in the TGA against weekly changes in reserves over the past two years.
As the level of reserves falls, the Federal Reserve will continue to learn and enhance its thinking about an efficient approach to open market operations that could incorporate both the trend growth and transitory volatility in non-reserve liabilities to maintain the excellent interest rate control experienced with higher levels of reserves.
The size of these purchases will vary over time based upon MBS prepayments. Of course, these purchases will be altering the composition but not the overall size of the System Open Market Account portfolio and Federal Reserve balance sheet.
At least initially, the FOMC will direct the Desk to conduct these MBS reinvestment purchases across a range of Treasury maturities to roughly match the maturity composition of securities outstanding.
The Desk will provide more details on these operations in May. In conclusion, the FOMC made an important decision in January to continue to implement policy in an ample-reserves regime.
This learning is ongoing, and we expect the factors driving reserve demand to evolve over time.